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Anti-Reflexivity and Climate Change 
Skepticism in the US General Public
Aaron M. McCright1
Department of Sociology
Michigan State University, Michigan, United States
Abstract
The leading theoretical explanation for the mobilization of organized climate 
change denial is the Anti-Reflexivity Thesis, which characterizes the climate 
change denial countermovement as a collective force defending the industrial 
capitalist system. In this study, I demonstrate that the Anti-Reflexivity Thesis 
also provides theoretical purchase for explaining patterns of climate change 
skepticism among regular citizens. Analyzing nationally representative survey 
data from multiple waves of the University of Texas Energy Poll, I  examine 
key predictors of climate change skepticism within the US general public. 
Identification with or trust in groups representing the industrial capitalist 
system increases the likelihood of climate change skepticism. Also, identification 
with or trust in groups representing forces of reflexivity (e.g., the environmental 
movement and scientific community) decreases the likelihood of such skepticism. 
Further, this study finds that climate change skeptics report policy preferences, 
voting intentions, and behavioral intentions generally supportive of the existing 
fossil fuels–based industrial capitalist system.
Keywords: anti-reflexivity thesis, climate change skepticism, policy preferences, 
voting intentions, behavioral intentions
Introduction
Over the last three decades, climate change has become successfully defined 
as a serious global problem deserving ameliorative action, due largely to the 
actions of the scientific community and environmental movement. During much 
of this same time, a climate change denial countermovement has mobilized 
to deny the reality and seriousness of climate change as a social problem by 
opposing the claims of the scientific community and environmental movement 
(e.g., Dunlap & McCright, 2016). Much scholarship analyzes the strategies, 
1  Author contact: mccright@msu.edu.
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techniques, and effectiveness of key components of this US-based climate 
change denial countermovement: fossil fuels (and other) industry organizations 
(e.g., Freudenburg, Gramling, & Davidson, 2008; Layzer, 2007), conservative 
think tanks (e.g., Dunlap & Jacques, 2013; McCright & Dunlap, 2000, 2003; 
Oreskes & Conway, 2010), contrarian scientists (e.g., Lahsen, 2008; McCright, 
2007), and Republican politicians (e.g., McCright & Dunlap, 2003, 2010). Recent 
work confirms the results of earlier studies and documents the evolving funding 
and organizational structure of this countermovement (e.g., Boussalis & Coan, 
2016; Brulle, 2014; Farrell, 2016a, 2016b).
The leading theoretical explanation for this mobilization of organized climate 
change denial is the Anti-Reflexivity Thesis (e.g., McCright & Dunlap, 2010), 
which characterizes the climate change denial countermovement as a collective 
force defending the industrial capitalist system against claims that the system 
causes serious problems. In this paper, I argue that the Anti-Reflexivity Thesis 
also may provide insights for understanding the patterns of climate change 
skepticism2 within the general public. Analyzing nationally representative 
survey data from multiple waves of the University of Texas Energy Poll, I test 
hypotheses derived from the Anti-Reflexivity Thesis to explain key predictors 
of climate change skepticism within the US general public. Further, since few 
studies focus on the attitudes and behaviors of climate change skeptics, I also 
examine how climate change skepticism is related to energy-related policy 
preferences, voting intentions, and behavioral intentions.
Briefly, this paper makes the following contributions. First, this study extends an 
emerging theoretical framework in environmental sociology by demonstrating 
the efficacy of the Anti-Reflexivity Thesis for explaining the dynamics of climate 
change skepticism in the general public. In the process, this study integrates key 
theoretical insights into the evolving scholarship on climate change skepticism. 
Second, the analyses determine the extent to which key Anti-Reflexivity Thesis 
variables (i.e., trust in and/or identification with forces of reflexivity or anti-
reflexivity) influence climate change skepticism independent of the effect of 
political orientation. This may provide theoretical guidance for understanding 
2  In this paper, I use “climate change denial” when discussing the individuals and organizations in 
the organized countermovement to challenge the reality and seriousness of anthropogenic climate change. 
I use “climate change skepticism” when discussing members of the general public who do not believe the 
scientific claims about climate change but who otherwise are not likely involved actively in the climate change 
denial countermovement. In my literature review of studies reporting the results of general public surveys, 
I use “skepticism” for what other scholars variously term “rejecting the science,” “denial,” “skepticism,” 
“contrarianism,” or “naysaying.” I do recognize that using “skepticism” in this way is inconsistent with 
how philosophers and sociologists of science historically have used the term, especially when discussing 
the institution of science (e.g., Merton, 1938). Yet, social scientists who study climate change lack a more 
accurate term between “skepticism” and “denial.” It seems prudent to reserve use of the term “denial” to 
those individuals and organizations actively challenging the reality and seriousness of anthropogenic climate 
change and apply the term “skepticism” to regular members of the general public who simply report views in 
opposition to the scientific community.
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climate change skepticism in those countries where climate change is less 
politicized and skepticism is less aligned with political orientation. Third, this 
study is one of the first to examine how climate change skepticism is related 
to other environmentally consequential decisions.
In the next section, I review those studies that specifically examine climate 
change skepticism among regular citizens. I then explain the key arguments of 
the Anti-Reflexivity Thesis, deriving insights for explaining citizens’ climate 
change skepticism. After describing the dataset and the variables used in the 
study, I present and discuss the results of my analyses. I close with a brief 
discussion of potential avenues for future research.
Survey research on climate change skepticism
The last 15 years have seen the emergence of a body of studies examining the 
patterns of climate change skepticism via survey research. This literature is still 
developing and remains characterized by a range of approaches and analytical 
techniques and, more consequentially, diversity in the operationalization of 
climate change skepticism. Nevertheless, a few clear patterns can be identified. 
In this section, I first describe the nature of these studies before summarizing 
their most robust empirical results.
Most of the studies in this emerging literature examine the predictors of climate 
change skepticism (e.g., Evans & Feng, 2013; Leviston & Walker, 2012; Poortinga 
et al., 2011), though a few treat climate change skepticism as a predictor variable 
(e.g., Capstick & Pidgeon, 2014; Engels et al., 2013; Smith & Leiserowitz, 2012). 
While some studies use small, non-representative samples,3 most utilize large, 
nationally representative samples from the United States (e.g., Feldman et al., 
2012; Hamilton, 2012; Leiserowitz et al., 2012; McCright & Dunlap, 2011a), 
Australia (e.g., Leviston & Walker, 2012; Leviston et al., 2013; Lewandowsky, 
Gignac, & Oberauer, 2013), Britain (e.g., Clements, 2012; Poortinga et al., 2011), 
or Germany (e.g., Engels et al., 2013).
Earlier work identifies four key dimensions of climate change skepticism: 
believing that the Earth is not warming and climate change is not happening 
(trend skepticism); believing that human activities are not causing climate 
change (attribution skepticism); believing that climate change will not have 
significant negative impacts (impact skepticism); and believing that there 
3  These studies using small, non-representative samples examine residents of a western Canadian city 
(Heath & Gifford, 2006), residents of a few British counties (Whitmarsh, 2011), the UK general public (Capstick 
& Pidgeon, 2014), residents of an Australian state (Lo, 2014), Australian adults (Hobson & Niemeyer, 2013), 
residents of a Swedish city (Häkkinen & Akrami, 2014), and visitors of climate blogs from multiple countries 
(Lewandowsky, Oberauer, & Gignac, 2013).
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is no strong scientific agreement on the reality and human cause of climate 
change (consensus skepticism) (e.g., McCright & Dunlap, 2000; McCright, 
Dunlap, & Xiao, 2013; Rahmstorf, 2004). Most of the studies in this literature 
operationalize climate change skepticism directly via single-item or composite 
measures.4 These studies can be classified according to the dimensions of 
skepticism they measure (even as they may also include items that do not easily 
fit into the following categories):
• trend skepticism only (e.g., Hmielowski et al., 2014; Leviston et al., 2013);
• trend and attribution skepticism only (e.g., Leviston & Walker, 2012);
• trend, attribution, and impact skepticism only (e.g., Capstick & Pidgeon, 
2014; Clements, 2012; Heath & Gifford, 2006; Leiserowitz et al., 2012; 
Lewandowsky, Oberauer, & Gignac, 2013; Lewandowsky, Gignac, 
& Oberauer, 2013; Lo, 2014; Whitmarsh, 2011); and 
• trend, attribution, impact, and consensus skepticism (Engels et al., 2013; 
Feldman et al., 2012; Häkkinen & Akrami, 2014; McCright & Dunlap, 2011a; 
Poortinga et al., 2011).
Few of the studies using nationally representative data provide descriptive 
statistics to allow comparison of the spread of climate change skepticism 
across countries and over time. Further, those studies that do report such 
statistics often utilize different measures of the various dimensions of climate 
change skepticism. Nevertheless, four studies report the results of analyses 
with nationally representative survey data from 2010 or 2011, allowing for at 
least a rough comparison: 2011 Germany (Engels et al., 2013), 2010 Australia 
(Leviston & Walker, 2012), 2010 United States (McCright & Dunlap, 2011a), and 
2010 Britain (Poortinga et al., 2011). The sole study examining climate change 
skepticism over time with multiple years of data finds that all dimensions of 
climate change skepticism increased in the US general public between 2001 and 
2010 (McCright & Dunlap, 2011a).
With the exception of Germany where all forms of skepticism are low—only 
about 7% of Germans are trend skeptics, 7% are attribution skeptics, 5% are 
impact skeptics, and 8% are consensus skeptics—(Engels et al., 2013), trend 
skepticism seems to be less prevalent than does attribution, impact, or consensus 
skepticism in Australia, Britain, and the United States. Nearly 19% of Americans 
believe that global warming will never happen (McCright & Dunlap, 2011a), 
while 15% of the British public does not think the world’s climate is changing 
4  Three studies operationalize climate change skepticism indirectly: giving factually incorrect answers to 
specific questions about climate change (Hamilton, 2012); providing “naysayer affective imagery” in responses 
to open-ended questions (Smith & Leiserowitz, 2012); and believing that environmental scientists don’t 
understand the causes of global warming very well and should have little influence in deciding what to do 
about global warming (Evans & Feng, 2013).
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(Poortinga et al., 2011), and between 6% and 17% of Australians (depending 
upon the measure) are trend skeptics (Leviston & Walker, 2012). Nearly 46% of 
Americans (McCright & Dunlap, 2011a), 18% of the British public (Poortinga 
et al., 2011), and about 40% of Australians (Leviston & Walker, 2012) attribute 
global warming solely or primarily to natural processes. About 48% of Americans 
(McCright & Dunlap, 2011a) and 40% of the British public (Poortinga et al., 
2011) believe that the seriousness of global warming is exaggerated. Finally, 
about 48% of Americans (McCright & Dunlap, 2011a) but only 21% of the 
British public (Poortinga et al., 2011) believe there is no scientific consensus on 
climate change.
Several clear patterns emerge from those studies examining predictors of climate 
change skepticism in the general publics of advanced industrial countries. By far 
the most robust predictor of climate change skepticism is political orientation, 
whereby ideological conservatives (Clements, 2012; Evans & Feng, 2013; 
Häkkinen & Akrami, 2014; Leiserowitz et al., 2012; Lewandowsky, Gignac, 
& Oberauer, 2013; McCright & Dunlap, 2011a) and supporters/members of 
conservative political parties (Campbell & Kay, 2014; Evans & Feng, 2013; Feldman 
et al., 2012; Hamilton, 2012; Leiserowitz et al., 2012; Leviston & Walker, 2012; 
McCright & Dunlap, 2011a; Poortinga et al., 2011; Whitmarsh, 2011) are more 
likely to report climate change skepticism than are their liberal counterparts. 
Several studies simply do not include a measure of political orientation (Capstick 
& Pidgeon, 2014; Cho et al., 2011; Engels et al., 2013; Heath & Gifford, 2006; 
Leviston et al., 2013; Lewandowsky, Oberauer, & Gignac, 2013; Lo, 2014). Yet, 
all survey studies that do include either political ideology or party identification 
or both find political orientation to be a significant predictor—typically one of 
the strongest predictors. Related to political orientation, other studies find that 
espousing a free market ideology (Campbell & Kay, 2014; Heath & Gifford, 2006; 
Lewandowsky, Gignac, & Oberauer, 2013; Lewandowsky, Oberauer, & Gignac, 
2013), strongly valuing private property rights (Lo, 2014), strongly supporting 
hierarchies (Häkkinen & Akrami, 2014), regularly viewing Fox News (Feldman 
et al., 2012), holding traditional values (Poortinga et al., 2011), and being a 
conservative Protestant (Evans & Feng, 2013) are also associated with climate 
change skepticism.
The performance of social, demographic, and economic variables is less 
consistent, though some patterns have emerged. Several studies find that weak 
environmental beliefs (Engels et al., 2013; Feldman et al., 2012; Whitmarsh, 
2011), weak environmental movement identity (McCright & Dunlap, 2011a), or 
strong environmental apathy (Heath & Gifford, 2006) are associated with climate 
change skepticism. Men report stronger climate change skepticism than do 
women (Clements, 2012; Feldman et al., 2012; Leviston & Walker, 2012; McCright 
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& Dunlap, 2011a).5 Further, low socioeconomic status (education and income) is 
associated with climate change skepticism, but only in the United Kingdom 
(Clements, 2012; Poortinga et al., 2011; Whitmarsh, 2011). The remaining socio-
demographic variables (e.g., age, religiosity, etc.)—when included in analyses 
at all—typically perform poorly or inconsistently in predicting climate change 
skepticism.
The Anti-Reflexivity Thesis
Reflexive Modernization Theory (e.g., Beck, 1992; Giddens, 1990; see also Rosa, 
Renn, & McCright, 2014) characterizes the current era of late modernity as 
a distinct stage of advanced industrial society where institutions suffer from 
legitimacy crises brought on by their inability to effectively solve the ecological 
and technological problems of modernization. Reflexive modernization scholars 
argue that heightened reflexivity is a necessary precondition for getting past 
our current ecological and technological crises. They define reflexivity as a 
self-confrontation with the unintended and unanticipated consequences of 
modernity’s industrial capitalist system. Two prominent forces of reflexivity, 
which promote such societal self-confrontation, are social movements and 
science (e.g., Beck, 1992; Giddens, 1990; Mol, 2000). Most notably, environmental 
activism and those scientific fields that examine the ecological and human health 
impacts of economic activities and new technologies—what Schnaiberg (1980) 
terms “impact science”6—attempt to force societal recognition of, and action 
on, our major ecological and technological crises.
During these times of fundamental societal change, other sectors of society—
for ideological and/or material reasons—mobilize to challenge the shift toward 
societal self-confrontation. Gleeson (2000) refers to this as a mobilization 
of “anti-reflexivity,” because it attempts to defend the legitimacy of the 
industrial capitalist system against the open-ended transformation of reflexive 
modernization. More specifically, it directly opposes the forces of reflexivity 
that identify problems caused by the industrial capitalist system and urge 
government action to deal with them. Within the United States, recognizing and 
attempting to deal with major ecological crises has provoked significant anti-
reflexivity since the late 1980s (Jacques, 2006; McCright, Xiao, & Dunlap, 2014).
5  McCright & Dunlap (2011a) document what they refer to as the “conservative white male” effect, 
whereby conservative white males are more likely to deny the reality and seriousness of climate change than 
are others in the general public.
6  “Impact science” stands in conceptual distinction from what Schnaiberg (1980) terms “production 
science,” or scientific activities in service to economic production. While this abstract, analytical typology is 
theoretically powerful (e.g., McCright et al., 2013), it can often be quite difficult to empirically distinguish 
impact science and production science (e.g., Gould, 2015).
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The Anti-Reflexivity Thesis (McCright & Dunlap, 2010) initially was developed 
to explain why certain sectors of advanced industrial society mobilized to defend 
the industrial capitalist system against the claims of social movements and the 
scientific community used to support calls for further governmental intervention 
into economic markets. While such opposition to governmental regulations has 
been a mainstay within industry and the conservative movement for many 
decades, a stronger version of anti-reflexivity emerged in the early 1990s. This 
was due largely to the rise of international environmentalism and environmental 
policy-making efforts to deal with global environmental problems (signaled by 
the 1992 Rio Earth Summit). Such an upsurge in reflexivity—culminating in 
the recognition of climate change as a significant global problem deserving 
substantial action—posed a much more fundamental challenge to the neoliberal 
expansionism of the industrial capitalist system than did earlier calls for more 
localized regulations to deal with air and water pollution (e.g., Foster et al., 
2011; Jacques, 2006; McCright, Xiao, & Dunlap, 2014).
McCright & Dunlap (2010, 2011b) argue that the most prominent manifestation 
of anti-reflexivity in the United States is the mobilization of the American 
conservative movement and fossil fuels industry to deny the reality and 
seriousness of climate change. The last two decades in the United States have 
seen an enduring conflict between those defining climate change as real and 
characterizing it as problematic (the scientific community, environmental 
organizations, and many Democratic policymakers) and those defending 
the industrial capitalist system by challenging climate science and denying 
the dangerousness of climate change (fossil fuels industry organizations, 
conservative think tanks, contrarian scientists, and many Republican 
policymakers) (Brulle, 2014; Farrell, 2016a, 2016b; McCright & Dunlap, 2000, 
2003, 2010; Oreskes & Conway, 2010).
While the Anti-Reflexivity Thesis has been used primarily to explain organized 
climate change denial activism (McCright & Dunlap, 2010), it has been extended 
to explain climate change skepticism among self-identified conservatives and 
Republicans in the US general public (McCright et al., 2016; McCright & Dunlap, 
2011b) and the ideological divide on trust in science within the US general 
public (McCright et al., 2013). I continue this line of scholarship by deriving 
key insights from the Anti-Reflexivity Thesis to explain broader patterns of 
climate change skepticism within the US general public. I limit this discussion 
to those general theoretical expectations and corresponding specific hypotheses 
that can be tested with the data used in this study.
Briefly, the Anti-Reflexivity Thesis expects that identification with, support for, 
or trust in groups representing or defending the industrial capitalist system 
increases the likelihood of skepticism that the system is causing significant 
problems necessitating governmental action. Such groups include, among others, 
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specific corporations (e.g., ExxonMobil), industry associations (e.g., American 
Petroleum Institute), conservative movement organizations (e.g., think tanks or 
foundations), and political parties (e.g., Republican Party) whose creeds espouse 
and actions embody defense of the industrial capitalist system and opposition to 
governmental regulations.7 The dataset in this study allows an empirical test of 
the following hypotheses.
Trust in groups representing the industrial capitalist system increases the 
likelihood of skepticism of the reality and human cause of climate change. (H1)
Identification with the Republican Party increases the likelihood of skepticism 
of the reality and human cause of climate change. (H2)
Also, the Anti-Reflexivity Thesis expects that identification with, support for, 
or trust in groups representing or defending forces of reflexivity decreases 
the likelihood of skepticism that the system is causing significant problems 
necessitating governmental action. Such groups include, among others, specific 
environmental movement organizations (e.g., Sierra Club) or the environmental 
movement more generally, the scientific community in general or specific 
science advocacy organizations (e.g., Union of Concerned Scientists), and 
political parties (e.g., Democratic Party) that accept the need for—and even 
advocate the use of—governmental regulations to solve problems created by the 
industrial capitalist system.8 The dataset in this study allows an empirical test of 
the following hypotheses.
Trust in groups representing forces of reflexivity decreases the likelihood 
of skepticism of the reality and human cause of climate change. (H3)
Identification with the environmental movement decreases the likelihood 
of skepticism of the reality and human cause of climate change. (H4)
Identification with the Democratic Party decreases the likelihood of skepticism 
of the reality and human cause of climate change. (H5)
In addition to testing these hypotheses, this dataset also allows investigation 
of how climate change skepticism relates to energy-related policy preferences, 
voting intentions, and behavioral intentions. This is significant since, other 
than Engel et al.’s (2013) study of German adults, scholars have not examined 
how energy-related attitudes and behaviors are related to climate change 
7  This provides theoretical purchase for explaining why identification with the Republican Party (or other 
Right-leaning parties or conservative ideology more generally) is the most consistent predictor of climate 
change skepticism in the literature (e.g., Evans & Feng, 2013; Feldman et al., 2012; Hamilton, 2012; McCright 
& Dunlap, 2011b).
8  This helps explain why several studies find that climate change skepticism is more likely among those 
with low or no identification with environmentalism (e.g., Heath & Gifford, 2006; McCright & Dunlap, 2011a; 
Whitmarsh, 2011).
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skepticism. The analyses below specifically help fill this important gap and 
improve our understanding of the extent to which climate change skepticism in 
the US general public matters more generally.
The study
Data for this study come from the University of Texas at Austin Energy Poll, 
which is designed and managed by the Energy Management and Innovation 
Center of the McCombs School of Business. Since 2011, this biannual survey 
includes both recurring questions about energy priorities, policies, and 
behaviors and one-time questions about specific energy issues. Indeed, the 
University of Texas Energy Poll is the only ongoing nationally representative 
survey of Americans’ energy views and behaviors. All waves, administered 
online in March and September, have independent samples of more than 2,000 
US adults. Data weights are used to make each sample representative of the 
US adult population.9
I combined the repeated cross-sections from Wave 2 (March 2012) to Wave 7 
(September 2014) into a pooled sample.10 The social, demographic, and political 
characteristics of this pooled sample are presented in Table 1. I used SPSS 19.0 
to perform all statistical analyses with weighted data. Not all of the selected 
survey items were asked in each wave or of all the subjects in a wave, so the 
sample sizes vary across dependent variables and models. Table 2 contains the 
exact wording of the survey questions used to create all composite measures 
and outcome variables.
Table 1: Description of the pooled sample
Pooled sample
(N = 12,958)
Gender (% female) 51.6
Age (% aged 18–39) 38.3
Race (% white) 79.0
Educational Attainment (% at least bachelor’s degree) 30.1
Household Income (1–8 scale: “less than $20K” to “$200K and more”) 4.11 (2.17)
Party Identification (N = 12,498)
 % Democrat 40.3
 % Independent 27.7
 % Republican 32.0
9  Additional details about the University of Texas Energy Poll can be found here: www.utenergypoll.com.
10  Wave 1 did not include the survey items used to create the climate change skepticism indicators.
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Pooled sample
(N = 12,958)
Religious Affiliation
 % Christian 40.0
 % non-Christian 6.9
 % non-religious 53.1
Religiosity (1–4 scale: “not religious at all” to “very religious”) 2.70 (1.01)
Parental status (% with child under 18 at home) 27.8
Employment status (% employed part- or full-time) 47.4
Place of Residence
 % Rural 24.0
 % Suburban 47.9
 % Urban 28.1
Note: Standard deviation is given in parentheses.
Two survey items were used to create the climate change skepticism indicators. 
Trend skepticism is measured by the following item: “Do you think global 
climate change is or is not occurring?” Trend skepticism is coded “1” for “is not 
occurring” and coded “0” for “is occurring” or “don’t know.” Approximately 
18.2% of the pooled sample (N = 12,958) are trend skeptics who do not 
think that climate change is occurring.11 While the survey does not contain 
a straightforward indicator of attribution skepticism as used in other studies, 
attribution skepticism can be reasonably approximated using the following 
item: “Please indicate the extent to which you think each of the following is 
a contributing factor in global climate change.” The response categories range 
from “not at all a factor” = 1 to “a very significant factor” = 5. Among the 
options are “coal” and “oil.” Attribution skepticism is coded “1” for those 
respondents who gave an answer of 0, 1, 2, or 3 for both coal and oil and is 
coded “0” for all other respondents. Approximately 21.1% of the pooled sample 
(N = 7,478) are attribution skeptics who believe that these fossil fuels are not 
significant contributors to climate change.12
11  This percentage is quite similar to that reported by McCright & Dunlap (2011a). Briefly those authors 
report that 18.9% of the American public in 2010 were trend skeptics.
12  This percentage is much less than the 46% of Americans in 2010 identified as attribution skeptics 
by McCright & Dunlap (2011a). The sizable difference between the 2010 percentage based on Gallup Poll 
data and the 2012–2014 percentage reported here is likely due to the different survey questions used to 
measure attribution skepticism. The item used here likely underestimates the actual prevalence of attribution 
skepticism in the US general public in 2012–2014.
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Two Anti-Reflexivity Thesis variables are composite measures. Briefly, 
respondents were asked how much they trust (“do not trust at all” = 1 to 
“trust completely” = 5) a few groups or organizations to provide them with 
information on how to use energy more efficiently or conserve energy.13 Trust in 
industrial capitalist groups (Spearman-Brown coefficient = 0.73)14 taps how much 
respondents trust in two representatives of the industrial capitalist system: 
“oil and gas companies” and “the US business community.” Trust in forces of 
reflexivity (Spearman-Brown coefficient = 0.74) taps how much respondents 
trust in two forces of reflexivity: “environmental groups” and “the academic/
scientific community.”
Identification with the environmental movement is measured with the following 
item: “As the term is generally used today, do you consider yourself to be an 
environmentalist?” Self-identified environmentalist is coded “2” for “yes, active 
environmentalist,” “1” for “yes, passive environmentalist,” and “0” for “no, 
not an environmentalist” or “prefer not to answer.” Approximately 12.4% of 
the pooled sample identifies as an active environmentalist, 36.4% as a passive 
environmentalist, and 51.2% as not an environmentalist.
Party identification is measured with a set of two dummy variables with 
“Independent” as the reference category.15 Republican includes those 
respondents who identify as “lean Republican” to “strong Republican,” and 
Democrat includes those respondents who identify as “lean Democrat” to 
“strong Democrat.” The small percentages of respondents who answered “other” 
or “prefer not to answer” were coded as Independent. The 3.5% of the pooled 
sample who identified as “Libertarian” were dropped from analyses.16 This 
resulted in the following percentages in the pooled sample: 32.0% Republican, 
27.7% Independent, and 40.3% Democrat.
Three indicators measure energy-related policy preferences. The single-item 
indicator, support for new EPA rules restricting emissions at coal-fired power 
plants, measures whether respondents “oppose” (–1), “support” (1), or are 
“not sure” (0) about the new EPA rules. The single-item indicator, support for 
development of renewable technologies, measures whether respondents believe 
(“no” =  0; “yes”  =  1) the federal government should focus on developing 
13  The survey used “use energy more efficiently” in Wave 2, “conserve energy” in Wave 3, and both “use 
energy more efficiently” and “conserve energy” in a split-half design in Waves 4–7. Thus, the survey did 
not ask about trust in general or about trust specifically on the topic of climate change but trust on the less 
politicized topic of energy conservation and efficiency.
14  Reliability analysis for the first two indexes was performed with the Spearman-Brown coefficient, which 
is more appropriate than is Cronbach’s alpha when only two items are available (e.g., Eisinga, Grotenhuis, 
& Pelzer, 2013).
15  Waves 2–7 did not include a survey item to measure political ideology.
16  In additional analyses, I retained those respondents identifying as Libertarian and included them in 
the Republican grouping. Analyses using this revised party identification indicator produced results closely 
similar to those presented here.
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renewable technologies. A composite index, support for subsidies for renewable 
energies (Cronbach’s Alpha = 0.83), measures whether respondents believe 
(“no”  = 0; “yes” = 1) the federal government should subsidize renewable 
technologies, energy efficiency, and electric vehicles.
Two indicators measure energy-related voting intentions. A composite index, 
intention to vote for a presidential candidate who supports fossil fuels development 
(Cronbach’s Alpha = 0.79), measures how more or less likely (“much less 
likely”  =  1 to “much more likely” = 5) respondents would be to vote for a 
presidential candidate who supports expanding offshore oil development in 
the Gulf Coast of Mexico, expanding domestic natural gas development, and 
approving the construction of the XL Keystone pipeline to transport oil from 
Canada to the Gulf Coast. Another composite index, intention to vote for a 
presidential candidate who supports renewable energy development (Cronbach’s 
Alpha = 0.82), measures how more or less likely (“much less likely” = 1 to “much 
more likely” = 5) respondents would be to vote for a presidential candidate who 
supports expanding financial incentives for companies engaged in renewable 
technologies, requiring utilities to get a certain percentage of electricity from 
renewable sources, and increasing funding for scientific and university research 
on new energy technologies.
Finally, two indicators measure energy conservation behavioral intentions. 
A composite index, intention to adopt energy conservation technologies (Cronbach’s 
Alpha = 0.83), measures how likely (“not at all likely” = 1 to “very likely” = 7 
and “do this currently/have done it already” = 8) that respondents would do the 
following within the next five years: own a hybrid vehicle, own a fully electric 
vehicle, own a vehicle that runs on natural gas, use “smart meter” technology 
allowing for better management of household electricity demand, and install 
solar panels at your home. Another composite index, intention to perform 
household energy conservation behaviors (Cronbach’s Alpha = 0.74), measures 
how likely (“not at all likely” = 1 to “very likely” = 7 and “do this currently/
have done it already” = 8) that respondents would do the following within 
the next five years: purchase energy efficient light bulbs, improve insulation 
in your home, purchase an energy efficient appliance, and have a home energy 
audit performed.
Ten demographic and social variables are employed as controls in the multivariate 
statistical analyses. Gender (“female” = 1) and race (“white” = 1)17 are measured 
with dummy variables. Age varies from “18–24” = 1 to “75 or over” = 11. 
Socioeconomic status is measured with three variables: education (“less than 
high school diploma” = 1 to “post-graduate degree” = 5), income (“less than 
17  For more direct comparability with prior studies of climate change skepticism, this category includes 
both non-Latino Whites and Latino Whites.
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$20,000” = 1 to “$200,000 or more” = 8) and employed (“not employed” = 0, 
“employed part- or full-time” = 1).18 Religiosity ranges between “not religious at 
all” = 1 to “very religious” = 4. Whether or not a respondent was the parent of 
a minor child (“parent” = 1) was measured with a dummy variable. Finally, place 
of residence was measured with two dummy variables (“urban” and “rural”) 
using “suburban” as the reference category.
Results and discussion
The influence of Anti-Reflexivity Thesis variables 
on climate change skepticism
Since both climate change skepticism measures are dichotomous, I used logistic 
regression analysis to test the five hypotheses derived from the Anti-Reflexivity 
Thesis. Table 3 presents the estimated odds ratios of key theoretical variables 
from logistic regression models predicting trend and attribution skepticism 
in the US general public. An odds ratio greater than 1 means that a predictor 
increases the odds of being a climate change skeptic rather than not being one, 
and an odds ratio lesser than 1 means that a predictor decreases the odds of 
being a skeptic rather than not being one.
As expected by the Anti-Reflexivity Thesis, trust in groups representing the 
industrial capitalist system increases the likelihood of skepticism of the reality 
and human cause of climate change (supporting H1). That is, trusting oil and 
gas companies and the business community on the topic of energy increases 
the likelihood of trend and attribution skepticism. This effect endures even 
when accounting for the effects of other key theoretical predictors and the 
demographic and social controls.
Further, compared to Independents, Republicans are more likely to be trend 
and  attribution skeptics (supporting H2). This effect (a positive relationship 
between conservative party identification and climate change skepticism) is 
consistent with most empirical work in the US (e.g., Hamilton, 2012; McCright 
& Dunlap, 2011a) and beyond (e.g., Leviston & Walker, 2012; Poortinga 
et al., 2011).
18  The “not employed” category includes full-time homemakers, students, retirees, and the temporarily 
unemployed.
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Table 3: Estimated odds ratios from logistic regression models predicting 
climate change skepticism in the US general public
Predictors Trend Skepticism
Model 1
Attribution Skepticism
Model 2
Anti-Reflexivity Variables
Trust in industrial capitalist groups 1.63*** 1.47***
Trust in forces of reflexivity 0.38*** 0.58***
Self-identified environmentalist 0.60*** 0.72***
Republican 2.29*** 1.45***
Democrat 0.54*** 0.87
Demographic and Social Characteristics
Female 0.78*** 0.88*
Age 1.00 1.02
White 1.62*** 1.45***
Education 0.95 1.02
Income 1.02 1.01
Employed 0.96 1.04
Religiosity 1.28*** 1.01
Parent 0.85* 0.94
Urban 0.99 0.76***
Rural 0.96 1.07
Survey Waves
Wave 3 0.67***
Wave 4 0.69*** 0.96
Wave 5 0.72*** 0.88
Wave 6 0.87 0.76**
Wave 7 0.76** 0.68***
Nagelkerke R2 0.39 0.13
N 12,471 7,265
Notes: The reference category for political party identification is “Independent.” The reference category 
for place of residence is “Suburban.” The reference category for survey wave in Model 1 is Wave 2, and 
the reference category for survey wave in Model 2 is Wave 3.
* p < .005  ** p < .001  *** p < .0001
Also as expected by the Anti-Reflexivity Thesis, trust in environmental groups 
and the scientific community on the topic of energy decreases the likelihood 
of trend and attribution skepticism (supporting H3). Further, identifying with 
the environmental movement decreases the likelihood of both dimensions of 
skepticism examined here (supporting H4). This effect (an inverse relationship 
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between environmental identity and climate change skepticism) confirms the 
findings of several earlier studies in the US (e.g., Feldman et al., 2012; Heath & 
Gifford, 2006; McCright & Dunlap, 2011a) and abroad (e.g., Engels et al., 2013; 
Whitmarsh, 2011). Hypothesis 5 receives partial support. Democrats are less 
likely than are Independents to be trend skeptics, but there is no statistically 
significant difference between Independents and Democrats on attribution 
skepticism.
Only two of the demographic and social controls have a consistent effect on both 
dimensions of skepticism. Briefly, males and whites are more likely than are 
their female and non-white counterparts to be trend and attribution skeptics, 
confirming an earlier finding (McCright & Dunlap, 2011a). Similar to what most 
prior studies find, the remaining demographic and social variables do not have 
consistent effects on climate change skepticism.
The influence of climate change skepticism on 
energy-related policy preferences, voting intentions, 
and behavioral intentions
Other than Engel et al.’s (2013) study of German adults, scholars have yet to 
examine how climate change skepticism is related to energy-related attitudes 
and behaviors. I investigate this here as a step to better understand the extent to 
which climate change skepticism in the US general public matters more broadly. 
The tables below present the effects of trend and attribution skepticism on 
citizens’ energy-related policy preferences (Tables 4 and 5), voting intentions 
(Table 6), and behavioral intentions (Table 7) not only controlling for demographic 
and social characteristics and the survey wave but also the key Anti-Reflexivity 
Thesis variables discussed above. Except for Models 5 and 6 in Table 5 (which 
use logistic regression to predict a dichotomous outcome variable), the models 
in these tables employ ordinary least squares (OLS) regression.
Briefly, both trend and attribution skepticism lead to greater opposition to 
policies shifting our economy away from its fossil fuels base. Compared to their 
non-skeptical counterparts, trend and attribution skeptics are less supportive 
of policies aimed at directly reducing greenhouse gas emissions (Table 4) 
and at developing and subsidizing renewable energy technologies (Table 5). 
These results complement those of Engels et al. (2013), who find that climate 
change skepticism correlates with greater support for fossil fuel energy sources 
(e.g., coal, oil) and with lesser support for renewable energy sources (e.g., wind, 
solar, hydro).
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Table 4: Coefficients (and standard errors) from OLS regression models 
predicting support for new EPA rules restricting emissions at coal-fired power 
plants in the US general public
Support for New EPA Rules Restricting 
Emissions at Coal-Fired Power Plants
Predictors Model 3 Model 4
Anti-Reflexivity Indicators
Trend skeptic –0.38 (.05)***
Attribution skeptic –0.22 (0.04)***
Trust in industrial capitalist groups –0.13 (0.02)*** –0.08 (0.02)***
Trust in forces of reflexivity 0.18 (0.02)*** 0.15 (0.02)***
Self-identified environmentalist 0.14 (0.02)*** 0.11 (0.03)***
Republican –0.09 (0.04)* –0.07 (0.05)
Democrat 0.14 (0.04)*** 0.14 (0.04)**
Demographic and Social Characteristics
Female –0.03 (0.03) –0.10 (0.03)**
Age 0.00 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
White –0.04 (0.04) –0.04 (0.04)
Education 0.07 (0.02)*** 0.08 (0.02)***
Income –0.01 (0.01) –0.00 (0.01)
Employed 0.03 (0.03) 0.04 (0.04)
Religiosity –0.03 (0.02)* –0.03 (0.02)
Parent 0.03 (0.03) 0.04 (0.04)
Urban 0.02 (0.04) 0.02 (0.04)
Rural –0.11 (0.04)** –0.13 (0.04)**
Constant –0.20 (0.10)* –0.19 (0.11)
Adjusted R2 0.31 0.18
N 2,029 1,468
Notes: The reference category for political party identification is “Independent.” The reference category 
for place of residence is “Suburban.”
* p < .005  ** p < .001  *** p < .0001
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Also, compared to their non-skeptical counterparts, trend and attribution 
skeptics are more likely to vote for a presidential candidate who supports 
fossil fuels development and less likely to vote for one who supports renewable 
energy development (Table 6). Further, compared to non-skeptics, trend and 
attribution skeptics are less likely to adopt energy conservation technologies 
and perform household energy conservation behaviors (Table 7). Briefly then, 
these results provide compelling evidence that climate change skepticism has 
an influence on environmentally consequential decisions beyond those directly 
related to the politicized issue of climate change. Indeed, even when controlling 
for the effects of other key predictors and controls, climate change skepticism 
is associated with attitudinal opposition to shifting away from fossil fuels and 
behavioral opposition to energy efficiency and conservation.
Several of the key Anti-Reflexivity Thesis variables also have reasonably strong 
effects on energy-related policy preferences, voting intentions, and behavioral 
intentions. For each of the seven energy-related outcome variables, trust in 
forces of reflexivity and identification with the environmental movement predict 
attitudes and behavioral intentions representing support for shifting from fossil 
fuels to renewable energy technologies and increasing energy conservation. 
Further, trust in representatives of the industrial capitalism system predicts 
policy preferences and voting intentions to defend the existing fossil fuel–based 
economic system and oppose new regulations.19
Compared to these variables, the party identification indicators have less 
consistent effects across the models. Compared to Independents, Republicans 
are less supportive of subsidies for renewable technologies and are more likely 
to vote for a Presidential candidate who supports fossil fuels development. 
Also compared to Independents, Democrats are more supportive of the new 
EPA rules restricting emissions at coal-fired power plants, more supportive 
of the development of renewable technologies, and more likely to vote for a 
Presidential candidate who supports renewable energy development. Neither 
party identification indicator is a consistent predictor of energy conservation 
behavioral intentions.
19  While trust in industrial capitalist groups has no influence on intentions to perform household energy 
conservation behaviors, it does have a positive effect on intentions to adopt energy conservation technologies.
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For the most part, respondents’ demographic and social characteristics account 
for little of the adjusted R2 values across the models in Tables 4 to 7. Not 
surprisingly, few of these control variables have consistent effects across the 
models. Education has a positive effect and living in a rural area (compared to 
living in a suburban area) has a negative effect on support for the EPA’s new 
rules restricting emissions from coal-fired power plants (Table 4). While whites 
report greater support for the development of renewable technologies than do 
non-whites, parents and less-wealthy adults report greater support for subsidies 
for renewable technologies than do non-parents and wealthier adults (Table 5).
Both males and parents are more likely than are females and non-parents to vote 
for candidates who support the development of either fossil fuels or renewable 
energy sources (Table 6). While older, lesser educated, wealthier, and more 
religious adults are more likely than are their respective counterparts to vote for 
a presidential candidate who supports fossil fuels development, non-Whites and 
rural residents are less likely than are their respective counterparts to vote for 
a presidential candidate who supports renewable energy development. While 
males and older adults are more likely than are females and younger adults 
to purchase or adopt energy conservation technologies, the reverse is true for 
performing household energy conservation behaviors (Table 7). Also, parents 
and wealthier adults are more likely than are non-parents and less-wealthy 
adults to adopt energy conservation technologies and perform household energy 
conservation behaviors. Finally, non-Whites, the highly educated, employed 
adults, and more religious adults are more likely than are their respective 
counterparts to adopt energy conservation technologies.
Conclusion
While the Anti-Reflexivity Thesis has been employed primarily to explain 
organized climate change denial (e.g., McCright & Dunlap, 2010), this study 
demonstrates that it also provides theoretical purchase for explaining patterns 
of climate change skepticism within the general public. Briefly, identification 
with or trust in groups representing or defending the industrial capitalist system 
increases the likelihood of skepticism of the reality and human cause of climate 
change. These effects suggest that anti-reflexivity more generally—beyond that 
which is institutionalized within and promoted by the politically conservative 
Republican party—likely impacts climate change skepticism in the general 
public. Also, identification with or trust in groups representing or defending 
forces of reflexivity decreases the likelihood of trend and attribution skepticism.
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Further, this study finds that both trend and attribution skepticism are related 
to citizens’ energy-related policy preferences, voting intentions, and behavioral 
intentions in ways consistent with the Anti-Reflexivity Thesis. That is, trend 
and attribution skeptics report attitudes and behavioral intentions that 
generally support the existing fossil fuels–based industrial capitalist system 
and oppose regulatory interventions to reform the system either slightly 
or substantially. These results demonstrate that climate change skepticism 
influences environmentally consequential decisions beyond those directly 
related to the politicized issue of climate change.
The literature on climate change skepticism is still developing, even as 
some robust patterns have emerged. Future survey research should continue 
examining predictors of climate change skepticism in the general publics of 
countries around the world. Such work may employ the Anti-Reflexivity Thesis, 
especially including measures of key components of the argument. For instance, 
finding that trust in and identification with forces of anti-reflexivity influence 
climate change skepticism independent of the effect of political orientation in 
the US suggests that these variables may be as or more efficacious in countries 
where climate change is less politicized and skepticism is less aligned with 
political orientation. Future work also should aim to employ more sophisticated 
techniques (e.g., structural equation modeling) to model both direct and indirect 
effects in path analyses. This research also may incorporate other theoretically 
relevant predictors (e.g., values orientations) that are likely to influence climate 
change skepticism.
Scholars also should conduct experimental work to investigate the types of 
messages, frames, messengers, and modes of delivery that may amplify or reduce 
climate change skepticism. A few such experimental studies have been conducted 
already. While some suggest there is cause for optimism regarding efforts at 
decreasing skepticism (e.g., Hornsey et al., 2015), others are less sanguine 
(e.g.,  McCright et al., 2016). Nevertheless, some recent developments—such 
as a growing number of prominent US Republicans and conservative leaders 
publicly accepting the science of climate change and advocating climate action 
(e.g., George Schultz, Bob Inglis, etc.) and Pope Francis’s June 2015 encyclical 
on climate change—suggest messages and messengers worthy of experimental 
testing.
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